The structure of the traditional Prisoners’ Dilemma can be generalized from its original prisoner setting. Suppose that the two players are represented by the colors, red and blue, and that each player chooses to either "Cooperate" or "Defect".
If both players cooperate, they both receive the reward R for cooperating. If both players defect, they both receive the punishment payoff P. If Blue defects while Red cooperates, then Blue receives the temptation payoff T, while Red receives the "sucker's" payoff, S. Similarly, if Blue cooperates while Red defects, then Blue receives the sucker's payoff S, while Red receives the temptation payoff T.
This can be expressed in normal form
Canonical PD payoff matrix
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate R, R S, T
Defect T, S P, P
and to be a prisoner's dilemma game in the strong sense, the following condition must hold for the payoffs:
T > R > P > S
The payoff relationship R > P implies that mutual cooperation is superior to mutual defection, while the payoff relationships T > R and P > S imply that defection is the dominant strategy for both agents. That is, mutual defection is the only strong Nash equilibrium in the game (i.e. the only outcome from which each player could only do worse by unilaterally changing strategy). The dilemma then is that mutual cooperation yields a better outcome than mutual defection but it is not the rational outcome because from a self-interested perspective, the choice to cooperate, at the individual level, is irrational.
It's one thing to say "the prisoner's dilemma doesn't apply here"; it's another to say it isn't a thing.
Oh it's totally a thing. It's just not a thing that applies to human behavior.
Let's go over the the table:
- Both options carry a potential "good" reward and a potential "bad" reward.
- The good and bad rewards for choosing to defect are both better than the equivalent rewards for choosing to cooperate.
Now let's look at the core assumptions of the standard Prisoner's Dilemma model:
- Both prisoners understand the nature of the game.
But if they understand that, they know that choosing to defect is a trap, which will most likely net them worse consequences than if they cooperate. This is similar to how someone who understands the nature of tic-tac-toe knows better than to play it with anyone over the age of 5, because it will always end in a draw.
- The prisoners have no loyalty to each other.
But even in the basic scenario of two fellow gang members being questioned by the police, that is an incredibly unlikely assumption. In an anarchist society were all associations are voluntary, it becomes even less likely. Without some outside influence, you simply don't remain part of a group if you feel no trust or loyalty towards it's members.
- The prisoners have no way of knowing what the other prisoner will choose.
This works fine when dealing with a complete unknown or a truly random variable, but not in this situation as it's presented. If nothing else, knowing that the other prisoner understands the nature of the game and has no loyalty towards you (both required assumptions of the game) gives you some insight into what choice they are likely to make. This is, in fact, the entire point of the exercise--deducing the outcome based largely on those assumptions.
- The prisoners have no opportunity for retribution or reward outside the game.
Again, exceedingly unlikely. And even if it were the case an iterative prisoner's dilemma provides multiple such opportunities within the game itself.
- The prisoners employ a very limited form of rationality in their decision making.
So that alone makes this not to apply to real life situations involving actual human beings--unless they're brain damaged or something. To make this thought experiment come out the way it's authors intend, they had to deliberately hamstring the reasoning capabilities of their theoretical subjects. Otherwise the prisoners would reach the same conclusion as the authors and realize that
cooperation was in their best interests.
This whole scenario reeks of intellectual masturbation and classism. College-educated intellectuals with PhD's devising a scenario where two actors of subhuman intellect make a choice that ultimately screws them over, but whose folly is apparent to the designers? Yeah, that's just an excuse to congratulate yourself on being so much smarter than your (imaginary) intellectual inferiors.
It's worth noting that the
original authors of the "Prisoner's Dilemma" did not present it in that format. Apparently we have
this guy to thank for adding the classist twist of framing it as a perpetuation of the "dumb, backstabbing criminals" trope.
While this allowed it to gain popularity outside of academic circles (by playing on pervasive and often racist stereotypes), it also introduced all of the problems I've outlined above. In short, the very framing that makes people think the prisoner's dilemma would apply to real-world social interactions also breaks it by negating many of the core assumptions the problem relies on.
Framed as an actual
prisoner's dilemma, it simply doesn't work.
The biggest problem here, the biggest logical leap you're making is that people are not cooperating while saying that they cooperate. This, right here, shows what you know about this:
unless you are able to acquire overwhelming military resources, you, a lone person, are not even capable of "taking what you want and killing whoever gets in your way."
That is the essence of what's wrong with that argument. "Anarchy will succeed because people cooperate because it's in their best interests" followed by "no one will take advantage of the lack of a system because no one will cooperate and thus they can't because they're outnumbered". Nothing enables a despot like a power vacuum.
There is no power vacuum in an anarchist society. Power is shared equally, allowing no room for anyone to gain more power than their fellows.
Also, cooperation is not binary. It is entirely reasonable that a community will cooperate with actions that benefit it, while actively resisting those that run counter to it's interests. In an anarchist society, one person amassing power over others would be something that runs counter to that society's goals, and would thus be opposed.
As for how hierarchical societies evolved in the first place, that answer is rather involved, and you wouldn't listen to what I said anyway.
This post is already pretty long, but if you really wish to pursue that point, say so and I'll post an explanation, later.
